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1. Qyerview of the System. Current approaches to expert systems' reasoning 
under uncertainty fail to capture the iterative revision process characteris­
tic of intelligent human reasoning. This paper reports on a system, called 
the Non-monotonic Probabilist, or NMP (Cohen, et al., 1985). When its in­
ferences result in substantial conflict, NMP examines and revises the assump­
tions underlying the inferences until conflict is reduced to acceptable 
levels. NMP has been implemented in a demonstration computer-based system, 
described below, which supports threat correlation and in-flight route replan­
ning by Air Force pilots. 
The NMP system uses a belief function representation of uncertainty (Shafer, 
1976), embedded within a process of non-monotonic reasoning. Belief functions 
were chosen because, unlike Bayesian probabilities, they take explicit account 
of the completeness of an evidentiary argument, and they provide a natural 
measure of the conflict between two or more arguments. The non-monotonic 
reasoning process is based on an internal representation (Figure 1) for the 
structure of an evidential argument. This structure is originally due to 
Toulmin et al. (1984). The conclusion of an argument, or claim, is supported 
by grounds, or evidence. In NMP, the conclusion is not a definite hypothesis, 
but rather a belief function over the set of possible hypotheses 
(corresponding to Toulmin's conception of probability as a modal qualifier of 
a claim). The link between evidence and conclusion is provided by a rule for 
deriving a belief function from the evidence; this rule is backed by a deeper 
theoretical or causal model j ustifying the construction of the belief func­
tion. Toulmin allows for poss ible rebuttals which weaken the link between the 
evidence and the conclusion by asserting conditions under which the rule is 
invalidated. Such invalidation is represented naturally within the theory of 
belief functions by discounting of the output belief function. 
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Figure 1: Structure of an Argument in NMP 
1. Work sponsored by the Air Force Wright Aeornautical Laboratories, 
Aeronautical Systems Division (AFSC), US Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 
45433 
159 
This framework resembles non-monotonic logic (e.g., Doyle, 1979) in that con­
clusions are accepted unless other propositions (members of the outlist; 
rebuttals) turn out to be true. Two important differences are: (1) NMP is 
based on a highly differentiated knowledge structure, unlike the essentially 
homogeneous knowledge structure of non-monotonic logic; and (2) NMP provides 
an explicit measure of the uncertainty in an argument. The knowledge struc­
ture of NMP gives the system access both to the theoretical basis for deriving 
a belief function and to the factors which could discredit the link between 
evidence and conclusion. As a consequence, the system has the potential for 
"reaching inside" an argument in the process of conflict resolution, and iden­
tifying or adjusting the assessments that led to the conflict. 
2. Combinin� Evidence and Conflict Resolution. The inference mechanism of 
NMP is based on Dempster's Rule for combining belief functions. The validity 
of Dempster's Rule depends on independence of the evidence on which the belief 
functions are based. Every attempt should be made to construct the system in 
such a way that independence holds. If this is not feasible, a more complex 
analysis is possible (Shafer, in press), but if the departure from indepen­
dence is not too serious, one may judge that the improvement in results is not 
worth the substantial increase in complexity. In any case, the current ver­
sion of NMP is based on Dempster's Rule. 
When combined belief functions are in basic agreement, the inference procedure 
ends with the application of Dempster's Rule. In contrast, the presence of 
conflict (i.e. significant belief assigned to mutually exclusive conclusions), 
indicates a flaw in one of the component arguments, and routine statistical 
aggregation would be inappropriate. In such situations, NMP, like a human ex­
pert, examines its assumptions to determine the cause of the conflict. This 
process of conflict resolution. involves the following steps. (1) The first 
step is to seek information that may discredit one of the component arguments. 
This may result in increasing belief in the presence of a discrediting factor 
which would discredit one of the arguments. If so, the discount rate of the 
"culprit" argument is increased, thereby reducing the conflict. (2) If sig­
nificant conflict remains, the system may seek additional independent informa­
tion relating to the conclusion. This typically will increase conflict, but 
may result in insight into the cause of the conflict. Going back to step 1, 
the system uses this new information to reprioritize its investigation of dis­
crediting factors. (3) If conflict is still unresolved, the system may ex­
plore modifications in the theoretical base for one of the conflicting argu­
ments. Unlike the investigation of discrediting factors, this step may in­
volve a change in the direction in which the argument points. (4) Finally, if 
significant conflict remains, the system discounts all component arguments, 
using a formula that takes into account each argument's contribution to the 
conflict (one might also include a measure of the firmness, or resistance to 
discounting, of each argument). 
The discrediting factors are represented by an internal knowledge structure. 
Each discrediting factor has associated with it (1) an initial belief function 
representing initial belief in factor presence (no information is represented 
as a vacuous belief function); (2) one or more tests for factor presence 
(representing information search options); (3) a set of possible outcomes for 
each test, each represented by a belief function for factor presence; and (4) 
a cost associated with performing each test. 
The discount rate for each belief function is equal to the amount of belief 
directly committed to the absence of one or more discrediting factors. This 
amounts to a default assumption that all uncommitted belief is assigned to 
factor absence (Cohen, Laskey, and Ulvila, 1986). The belief function is dis-
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counted by multiplying belief in all focal elements by 1 minus the discount 
rate, and increasing belief in the universal set so that beliefs sum to one. 
If the initial belief function is non-vacuous, discounting occurs prior to ap­
plication of Dempster's Rule. When conflict occurs above a threshold level, 
our prototype system implements steps 1 and 4 of the conflict resolution pro­
cedure as follows. First, the system decides on a "culprit" discrediting fac­
tor and a test to perform by weighing its cost against its potential for con­
flict reduction. If no test is worth performing, step 4, or across-the-board 
discounting, is invoked. Otherwise, the system performs the chosen test, up­
dates the belief function over factor presence, computes a new discount rate 
for the conclusion belief function, and recombines the new discounted belief 
function with the others. This process is repeated until conflict reaches an 
acceptable level. 
This conflict resolution procedure is non-monotonic in character, and posesses 
important parallels to Doyle's (1979) non-monotonic logic. In a strict 
Shaferian analysis, the input belief functions remain fixed, and adding more 
evidence always increases the reliability of the conclusion (in the sense that 
less belief is committed to the universal set). Yet Shafer himself (in press) 
has informally proposed a non-monotonic revision (discounting) of the input 
belief functions when significant conflict leads to counter-intuitive conclu­
sions (Cohen, et al., 1985). The NMP system implements this revision process 
within an expert system. Belief functions are represented as based on 
assumptions: the system initially acts as if all discrediting factors are ab­
sent. When conflict arises, the system searches for a "culprit assumption" 
(the absence of a discrediting factor) and looks for evidence of its presence. 
When such evidence is found, the system modifies the culprit assumption by 
discounting the belief function associated with the discrediting factor. Un­
like Doyle's system, the prioritization of the search f_or "culprits" is made 
explicit and is based on a benefit-cost tradeoff, and the information search 
is undertaken only if the possible result is worth its cost (otherwise, the 
system uses the across-the-board discounting of Step 4). 
3. Application to Air Force Threat Correlation and Route Replanning. The NMP 
inference framework has been implemented in a small-scale prototype system 
designed to support pilots on deep interdiction or offensive counterair mis­
sions. The focus is in-flight route replanning in response to pop-up threats 
(i.e. threats which are discovered at sufficient range to permit rerouting). 
The system focuses on surface-to-air missile sites or artillery. 
The Adaptive Route Replanner (ARR) is assumed to begin its mission with prior 
information (represented by a belief function) about the location of a par­
ticular surface-based anti-air threat. During flight, the system is notified 
of a second threat localization (from a SAR signal), represented by a second 
belief function. The system must assign degrees of belief among three 
possibilities: (1) the two belief functions represent the same threat, in the 
same location; (2) the original threat has moved to a new location; and (3) 
the second signal comes from an entirely new threat, previously undetected. 
The system must also provide measures of uncertainty regarding the locations 
of the threat(s). 
In addition to the two belief functions representing threat localizations, ARR 
also has belief functions representing its domain knowledge, such as the range 
of distances a threat can move; how thorough was prior area intelligence (i.e . 
how likely is it that a threat was missed); and how far from the original 
threat is the second threat likely to be. 
ARR's evidence is summarized by five belief functions over the space AxAXT, 
where A is the area in which the threats may be located (for simplicity, as -
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sumed to be 2-dimensional space), and T-{S,D} is the set indicating whether 
the two signals represent the same or different threats. The two copies of A 
represent the two threat localizations. The three hypotheses of interest are: 
same threat, unchanged location (U), represented by the set {(a,a,S): aeA}; 
threat has moved (H), represented by the set ((a,b,S): a,bEA, �b); different 
threats (D), represented by the set {(a,b,D): a,bEA}. (Note that the symbols 
a and b represent vectors in 2-dimensional space A.) 
The five belief functions are described below. 
Summarizes prior evidence about the location of the first threat. 
Focal elements are of the form Sx(a1)xAXT, where Sx(a1) is a circle 
of radius x centered at the point a1 . Thus, the evidence localizes 
the first threat with increasing belief within circles of increas­
ing radius, but contains no information about the location of the 
second threat or whether they are the same or differnt. 
Summarizes evidence about the location of the second threat. 
Analogously to Bel1, focal elements are of the form AXS (a2)xT, 
localizing the threat within circles centered at a2, but providing 
no information about the first threat or whether they are the same. 
Bel3: Summarizes evidence about movement. One focal element is 
(Hx(S})U(AXAX(D}), where H- {(a,a): aeA}. This focal element rep­
resents belief in "unchanged, if same." The other focal elements 
are nested distance ran1es, of the form (C�T)�(AXAX{D)), where Cw 
- {(a,b): f*(w)�la-bl�f (w)}, with f*(w) and f (w) being lower and 
upper bounds for the distance range of Cw. The Cw represent belief 
in "if moved, then the distance range is f*(w) to f*(w)." Bel3 
contains no information about separation if threats are different. 
Bel4: Summarizes evidence about the thoroughness of prior area intel­
ligence. There are two focal elements, AxAX{S} and AXAxT. The 
first represents belief in intelligence sufficiently thorough that 
a threat was unlikely to be missed (i.e. threats are the same). 
The second represents uncommitted belief. There is no information 
about the location of either threat. 
Bel5: Summarizes evidence about how far apart different threats are 
likely to be. Focal elements are of the form (Bzx{D})U(AxAX{S}), 
where Bz - ((a,b): la-bl�g*(z)}, with g*(z) being a lower bound for 
the distance range of Bz. The Bz represent belief in "if dif­
ferent, then threats are separated by at least g*(z)." Be15 con­
tains no information about separation if the threats are the same. 
The system operates on these belief functions in three passes. (I) Forward 
chaining combination of belief functions using Dempster's Rule. The process 
ends here if conflict is below a pre-set threshold. (II) Prioritization and 
(possible) performance of tests. This step may be executed several times, un­
til conflict is below threshold (in which case the process ends) or until no 
test meets the benefit·cost criteria (in which case the next pass is 
executed). (III) Across-the-board discounting of all arguments. After per­
forming its inferences, the system derives the action implications--it com­
bines its threat classification (moved, unchanged, or different) with its 
knowledge of the danger contours associated with the threats, and selects the 
best of several candidate routes. 
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The forward chaining process is a straightforward application of Dempster's 
Rule. Belief in the three hypotheses can be obtained by taking the marginal 
of the combined belief function over the set T. Figure 2 shows the results of 
forward chaining in a numerical example. The input belief functions are given 
in the top part of the figure, and the probabilities of the three hypotheses 
(unchanged, moved, different) are shown below. 
Bel1: 
Bel2: 
Bel3: 
Bel4: 
Bel5: 
Input Belief Functions 
Center of Contours • (20, 20) 
Radius 4.5 9.5 15.0 22.0 
Committed Belief .18 .18 .18 .18 
Center of Countours • (80, 80) 
Radius 9.0 19.0 30.0 45.0 
COIIIDitted Belief .18 .18 .18 .18 
Belief Assigned to Diagonal • 0.3 
Lower Dhtance 10.0 9.0 7.5 6.0 
Upper Distance 13.0 15.0 18.0 22.0 
Committed Belief .15 .15 .15 .15 
Belief Assigned to Same Threet • 0.7 
Lower Distance 60.0 49.0 40.0 32.0 
Upper Distance ClO CXl <XI CXl 
Committed Belief .17 .17 .17 .17 
Combined Belief Function: Classification of Secon d Threat 
(U • unchan ged; M • moved; D • different) 
33.0 
.18 
1o:o 
.18 
0.0 
co 
.10 
26.0 
co 
.17 
Bel.,.C{U}) • .089 
Bel.,.({M}) • .373 
Bel.,.C{D}) • .297 
Pl.,.C{U}) • .170 
Pl.,.({M}) • .575 
Pl.,.({D}) • .508 
Con flict (Mass Assigned to Null Set) in Combined Belief Function • .409 
Figure 2: Example of Forward Chaining 
60.0 
.10 
120.0 
.10 
20.0 
.15 
In this example, conflict, or mass assigned to the null set, is a relatively 
large 0.42. It is instructive to consider how conflict arises. Conflict oc­
curs to the extent that there is evidence against all three hypotheses (U, M, 
and D). Figure 3 shows six different types of conflict, corresponding to the 
six different ways in which mass can be assigned to the null set when 
Dempster's Rule is applied. The rows are the conflict types, and the columns 
represent reasons for the conflict. Thus, the first type of conflict occurs 
to the extent that belief is committed to non-overlapping contours of Bel1 and 
Bel2 (evidence against U), to non-movement (i.e. to the focal element 
(Hx{S))U(AxAX{D)) of Bel3--evidence against M), and to distances incompatible 
with the distance contours of Bel5 (evidence against D). The fifth type of 
conflict occurs to the extent that there is belief committed to distances in• 
compatible with the movement contours of Bel3 (evidence against M), but to 
movement in case threats are the same (i.e. not committed to the focal element 
(Hx{S))U(AxAX{D))--evidence against U), and to good prior intelligence 
coverage (evidence against D). 
The conflict level of 0.42 exceeds the threshold for initiating the second 
pass of the inference mechanism (the threshold was set to 0.25 in our 
example). In the second pass, the system first decides on a discrediting 
factor to test for and a test to perform. The choice is based on a cost­
benefit tradeoff. The potential benefit of a test is defined as the maximum 
possible conflict reduction that could occur as a result of performing the 
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test. Because conflict reduction is linear in the discount rate (Cohen, Las­
key, and Ulvila, 1986), the benefit is the product of the derivative (with 
respect to conflict) of the belief function associated with the discrediting 
factor, and the maximum discount rate that could occur as a result of the 
test. The test is chosen for which the potential benefit per unit cost is the 
highest. 
CQNFLICT TYPE 
(1} 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
DISTANCE 
CONTOUR PRECLUDES 
HON-OV!RI.AP !>pVEMENI 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
EVIDENCE FOR 
HJVPH:NT (it 
s!l!!!! threat> 
X 
X 
EVIDENCE DISTANCE 
AGAINSt PRECLUDES 
HJVEMENT QIFFERENI 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
Figure 3: Reasons for Conflict--Six Types of Conflict 
COVERAGE 
OOOD 
X 
X 
X 
In our example, the system decides to test for the presence of ECM (electronic 
countermeasures) in the area. Performing the test results in discounting the 
belief function Bel2 by a discount rate of 0.4. The new belief assignments 
are displayed in Figure 4. Two features are worthy of note. First, the 
amount by which the belief assignments for the three hypotheses fail to sum to 
1.0 (a measure of incompleteness of evidence) increases after discounting 
(from 0.241 to 0.309). Second, belief in M and U has increased relative to 
belief in D (we discounted one of the belief functions contributing to 
evidence against U; our evidence against D, the belief in thorough intel­
ligence, has not changed). Conflict has now been reduced to just below the 
threshold of 0.25. If conflict remained above the threshold, the system would 
search for another test to perform. If no acceptable test were found (i.e. no 
test for which the benefit/cost ra�io was above a threshold), then the system 
would proceed to the overall discounting step. 
ECH Present: Bel2 discounted (discount rate • 0.4) 
Bel.({U}) • .153 
Bel.({M}l • .398 
Bel*({D}l • .1�0 
Pl,.C{U}) • .292 
Pl,.C{M}l • .641 
Pl,.< {D}) • . 398 
Figure 4: Results of Discounting: ABM Classification 
Changes in the example have an impact agreeing with intuition. If the second 
threat localization is closer to the first threat (say, (50,60) instead of 
(80,80)), conflict in the initial pass is only .17, so the second pass is 
never initiated. Belief in a moved threat is fairly high (Bel*({U}) - . 15; 
Bel*({M})- .43; Bel*({D})- .09). If instead, belief in thorough area intel­
ligence is reduced to 0.3, conflict is again below threshold at .18, but this 
time the combined belief function favors different threats (Bel*({U}) - . 02 ; 
Bel*({M})- .11; Bel*({D))- . 51) . 
4. Conclusions. In virtually all problem solving domains where expert sys­
tems technology might be introduced, there is need for explicit and valid 
quantitative modeling of uncertainty. At the same time, we argue the need for 
a metastructure of qualitative reasoning in which the assumptions utilized in 
the �robability model are reassessed and revised in the course of the argu­
ment. These dual requirements are addressed by the NMP inference framework. 
The prototype system described above has demonstrated the feasibility of a 
self-revising inference engine for handling uncertainty, and has produced a 
preliminary design for expert systems inferencing with a very wide potential 
applicability. 
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